The article examines the effects of and regulatory changes presented by the USA PATRIOT Act on international and Islamic banking transactions. Of particular relevance is Title III, International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001. Individuals and institutions, particularly foreign-based, will face increased levels of scrutiny and must present additional forms of identification when opening accounts.
This article presents recommendations for how the Islamic finance industry can best counter sources of terrorist funding. Islamic financial institutions must develop greater levels of trust with the regulatory regimes of the industry and affinity organizations. Greater supervisory control is needed, as well as further standardization of shari`a guidelines.
This article examines the estimated income and savings rates for North American and European Muslims, as well as estimates on the amount of money contributed to charities and remittances to their country of origin.
This article is excepts of an address given at the Conference on Financial War on Terrorism, in London. It outlines the stance of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) and the regulatory steps and standards it has and plans to undertake in order to help promote growth in the Islamic finance sector and to counter terrorist activity within these institutions. The overall goals of the IDB are to promote economic development within member countries and
English courts have been the site of two recent cases pertaining to Islamic finance; The Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd vs. Symphony Gems N.V. and others (2002), and Shamil Bank of Bahrain vs. Beximco Pharmaceuticals Limited and others (2004). The courts evaluated the cases on the basis of the English law which governed each contract, not on the shari`a components, much to the benefit of the Islamic financial institutions.
The International Investor (TII) of Kuwait and Dallah AlBaraka Group (DBG) of Bahrain have reached a settlement in London in response to the failed merger of 2002. The outcome is that DBG will compensate TII in cash and assets, while still retaining a 15% share in TII. This settlement should help to stimulate both groups and provide an opportunity for improvements in management.